By Anastasija Mladenovska
On 9 July 2025, the European Parliament adopted its progress report on Macedonia and, in the process, quietly deleted every reference to the “Macedonian language” and “Macedonian identity.” The amendment passed by a broad cross-party majority. In Brussels, it reads like legislative housekeeping. In Skopje and among Macedonians across Europe, it felt like erasure.
If this were merely semantics, we wouldn’t care. But words in European lawmaking are scaffolding: they hold up meanings, histories, and people. When the Parliament strikes “Macedonian language” from a report, it sends a signal that our language, and the people who speak it, are negotiable. That signal did not emerge in a vacuum. It follows years of bilateral pressure, especially from Bulgaria, to fold Macedonian distinctiveness into someone else’s national story, and it rides on a familiar EU instinct: to smooth “sensitive” disputes by deleting the vocabulary that makes them visible.
I didn’t always feel the sting of this kind of erasure. Four years ago, I left Macedonia to pursue my education in the United States. At the time, I was among the guard of young Macedonians ashamed to be Macedonian, not because I had examined our history and rejected it, but because the version of our country we learned in school was relentlessly bleak. We were taught about our corruption, our poverty, our dysfunction, rarely about our resilience, our cultural wealth, or the stubbornness of our democratic aspirations. In the Western Balkans, surrounded by a political climate that rewarded cynicism, it was easy to internalize the idea that there was little in our national story to defend.
It took distance to break that spell. Maybe one really does learn to love her country from abroad, but for me it was less romance than realization. In Ohio, where people couldn’t place my country on a map, I became a cultural ambassador by default. “Macedonia” was often met with polite confusion; “Is that Greece?” was a frequent follow-up. I began to understand that I was carrying more than my own life abroad, I was carrying my country’s name, language, and existence into spaces where they would otherwise not appear at all.
For Macedonians abroad, the consequences are felt everyday. In Ohio, in Brussels, in Berlin, anywhere our name already comes with an asterisk, this quiet edit confirms the suspicion that our identity is conditional. It emboldens those who believe it should disappear entirely. And for young people back home, it reinforces the message I grew up with: that being Macedonian is something to be defensive about.
But it doesn’t have to be. If living abroad has taught me anything, it is that the work of defending one’s identity cannot be outsourced to governments alone. It happens in classrooms, in conference halls, in late-night conversations with strangers who ask where you’re from. It happens in insisting, gently but firmly, that our language has a name, and that it is ours.
Europe may not know us, but that is not inevitable. It is a choice. And the Parliament’s recent vote shows that it is making the wrong one. If the EU is serious about its founding motto, “united in diversity,” then it must restore our name to its own sentences, and with it, the recognition that unity built on erasure is no unity at all.
What Europe Forgot It Knew
Europe has already recognized what it just pretended to forget. The 2018 Prespa Agreement—the very deal the EU hailed as a model of conflict resolution, codified that the nationality shall be “Macedonian/citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia,” and that the official language shall be “the Macedonian language,” part of the South Slavic family. The treaty also clarified that the terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” carry different meanings in Greece and in our state, an explicit partition of symbols to protect identities, not dissolve them.
If Prespa is Europe’s benchmark for responsible compromise, then the Parliament’s deletions aren’t neutral—they walk back the very guarantees that made compromise possible. And that is why it hurts.
Who Are the Macedonians?
The question is not new; the literature is vast. But it is astonishing how often policymakers pretend the research does not exist.
Krste Misirkov asked it first in modern form—За македонцките работи (On Macedonian Matters) (1903)—arguing for a Macedonian literary language and national awakening grounded in local realities, not borrowed myths.
Horace Lunt’s A Grammar of the Macedonian Literary Language (1952) and Blaže Koneski’s codification work grounded the standard language after WWII—evidence not of “invention,” but of the same modern nation-building processes that standardized other European languages.
Loring Danforth’s The Macedonian Conflict (1995) mapped how identities are made and policed across borders, while Keith Brown’s The Past in Question (2003) showed how everyday life in western Macedonia forges belonging beyond archival purity.
Victor Roudometof traced the region’s competing national mythologies and memory regimes; Andrew Rossos wrote the longue durée history of Macedonia and the Macedonians; Vasiliki Neofotistos examined identity politics after Prespa, reminding readers that international “solutions” always ripple through local lives.
In other words: Macedonian identity isn’t a claim to antiquity. It is a modern European identity with the same ingredients everyone else has, language standardization, institutions, cultural production, and the painful work of drawing boundaries of “we” and “they.” The literature shows a people who emerged in dialogue and conflict with neighbors, under empires and federations, and who built a civic and linguistic community that stands on its own.
Of course, I shouldn’t have to explain who the Macedonians are, but Europe’s neglect has left us so misunderstood that the burden now falls on us to defend our own existence, even against the occasional Greek-heritage keyboard warrior in a Berlin apartment itching for a troll.
Why This Deletion Matters
First, it violates the EU’s own approach to enlargement. If identity questions belong to negotiating frameworks and treaties, then deleting our identity terms from a parliamentary text is not “de-politicization”; it is a political choice to appease the most veto-wielding neighbor in the room. That choice corrodes trust in the EU among ordinary Macedonians who took the leap of Prespa in good faith.
And let’s stop pretending that Brussels is still driven by a genuine appetite for enlargement. Moves like this make it clear that the process has become less about integrating the Western Balkans and more about managing them indefinitely from the waiting room.
Second, it emboldens maximalists. The amendment’s success will be read, indeed – already is being read in Sofia as proof that hardball works. It also hands ammunition to illiberals at home who argue Europe will never accept us as we are, so why compromise again? This is not theoretical; it lands in the middle of a high-stakes standoff about constitutional changes and the Bulgarian minority that already stalls the accession path.
Third, it rewrites memory by stealth. Deleting “Macedonian language” from an EU text will not change what we speak. But it does teach Europe’s future civil servants and journalists that our language is controversial enough to be unsayable. That’s how soft erasure works: not by banning “people”, but by discouraging the words that name them.
The EU’s Quiet Precedent
The official vote numbers tell the story: the Parliament adopted amendments tabled by leading groups that removed references to Macedonian identity and language. You can read it in the news blasts and in the amendment packets themselves; this is not rumor.
It sets a precedent with consequences beyond Macedonia. If identity can be negotiated down in the footnotes of enlargement, then any small nation with contested symbols should worry. Europe cannot be “united in diversity” by redlining certain diversities from its documents.
A Better European Answer
Europe already knows how to do better, its scholars model it.
Danforth, Brown, Roudometof, Rossos, Neofotistos (and many others) locate Macedonian identity where modern European identities always live: in institutions, language, culture, and the everyday. They do not confuse recognition with endorsement of any neighbor’s nationalist teleology. They do not make our dignity conditional on what others believe about our origins. They simply insist on describing the world as it is.
The Parliament should do the same. Restore the terms “Macedonian language” and “Macedonian identity” in subsequent resolutions. Explicitly reaffirm Prespa’s linguistic and nationality provisions. Signal to member states and candidates alike that bilateral disputes will not be laundered through legislative euphemism.
What We Must Do
For Macedonian leaders: build a broad coalition, government, opposition, civil society, diaspora, to press Brussels on principle, not pique. Make the case in Europe’s own language: that recognition is a rule-of-law issue (treaties matter), a democratic issue (citizens’ self-designation matters), and a geopolitical issue (credibility in the Western Balkans matters).
For European allies: speak up. There is nothing “anti-European” about insisting that European texts name a European people. If this can be erased about us, it can be erased about anyone less powerful next time.
For scholars and editors: keep publishing pieces that refuse the lazy frame,“Are Macedonians real?”,and ask instead: What obligations follow from what we already know? That is what good scholarship, and good European policy, requires.
Europe doesn’t have to love our story. But it cannot keep pretending it doesn’t know it. The Macedonian people exist, the Macedonian language exists, and Europe itself has recognized both, on paper, in treaties, and in practice. If Brussels wants the Western Balkans inside the Union, it should start by keeping our name in its sentences.
About the Author

Anastasija Mladenovska is a Macedonian-born scholar and writer whose work spans political science, Russian and Eurasian studies, and questions of identity in migration and diaspora. Now based in the United States, she explores how displacement and belonging shape both personal and collective memory. Her essays and commentary appear in venues such as Happy Captive, The Oxford Political Review, and Balkan Insight. She is also the author of Искра, a novel published at sixteen, and continues to write across genres at the intersections of scholarship and lived experience.
Anastasija was a Spring 2025 UMD International Policy and Diplomacy Fellow and assisted with the UMD Macedonian Women’s Conference.




